Abstract. Identitym anagementh as been recently considered to be a viable solution for simplifying user managementa cross enterprise applications. When users interact with services on the Internet, they often tailor the services in some way for their personal use through their personalized accounts and preferences. The network identityo fe achu ser is the global set of sucha ttributes constituting the various accounts. In this paper, we investigate two well-known federated identitymanagement (FIM) solutions, Microsoft Passport and Liberty Alliance,a ttempting to identify information assurance (IA) requirements in FIM. In particular, this paper focuses on principal IA requirements for WebS ervices that plays an integral role in enriching identityf ederation and management. We also discuss our experimental analysis of those models.
their partners, this problem became even worse. As as et of underlying technologies and processes overarching the creation, maintenance, and termination of user identities, IM has attempted to resolves uchi ssues.
Furthermore, the prevalence of business alliances or coalitions necessitates the further evolution of IM, so called federated identitym anagement( FIM). The main motivation of FIM is to enhance user convenience and p rivacy as well as to decentralize user managementt asks through the federation of identities among business partners. As ac onsequence, ac ost-effectivea nd interoperable technology is strongly required in the process of federation. WebS ervices (WS) can be as ag ood candidate for suchr equirementa si th as served to provide the standard way to enable the communication and composition of various enterprise applicationso verd istributed and heterogeneous networks.
Since identityf ederation is likely to go along with the exchange of sensitive user information in ah ighly insecure online environment, securitya nd privacy issues with suchexchange of information are keyconcerns in FIM. In this paper, we describeacomparatives tudy of FIM to investigate howt oe nsure information assurance (IA) for identityf ederation. We first discuss keyb enefits of FIM and howW Sc an playa ni ntegral role in enriching IM through federation. Then, we investigate two well-known FIM solutions, Liberty Alliance [HW03] and Microsoft Passport [tr103] , attempting to identify IA requirements in FIM. In addition, we describeo ur experimental study on those models.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2o verviews three approaches involved in IM, along with the prior researchworks relatedtoour work. Section 3d escribes FIM, particularly,L ibertya nd Passport in detail. Section 4 discusses the role of WS in federating identities in the two models. Section 5 articulates IA requirements for FIM followedb yt he experimentation details in Section 6. Section 7c oncludes this paper.
2I dentityM anagementa nd Related Works
In this section, we start with the discussion of IM approaches. We categorize IM approaches into the following three styles: isolatedI M , centralized FIM,a nd distributedFIM.Thereafter, we discuss the core components of WS architectures.
The isolated IM model is the most conservativeo ft he three approaches. Eachb usiness forms its owni dentitym anagementd omain (IMD) and has its ownw ay of maintaining the identities of users including employees, customers, and partners. Hence, this model is simple to implementa nd has at ightc ontrol overu ser profiles. However, it is hard to achieveu ser convenience with this model since differentI MDs are likely to have differenta uthentication processes or mechanisms for their users and corresponding authentication policies may vary between players.
The centralized FIM model has asingle identityprovider (IDP) that brokers trust to other participating members or service providers (SP) in aC ircle of Trust (CoT). IDP being as ole authenticator has ac entralized control overt he identitym anagementt ask, providing easy access to all SP domains with simplicityo fm anagementa nd control. The drawbacko ft his approachi sasingle pointo ff ailure within aC oT infrastructure in case that IDP fails to provide authentication service. User convenience can be also achieved partially in that the single sign-on (SSO) for users is only effectivew ithin SPs whichb elong to the same CoT.
The distributed FIM model provides af rictionless IM solution by forming a federation and making authentication ad istributed task. Every membera grees to trust user identities vouchedf or by other members of the federation. This helps users maintain their segregated identities, making them portable across autonomous policy domains. It also facilitates SSO and trust, therebya llowing businesses to share the identitym anagementc ost with its partners. Microsoft Passport is based on the centralized FIM model, while LibertyA lliance aims to be the distributed FIM model.
Earlier works related to user identitym anagementw ere mostly focused on a user-centric approach [ DPR99] , where users have control overI Mf unctions. A simple idea of managing user identities is described in [Cha85] . They proposed the use of personal card computers to handle all payments of au ser, thereby ensuring the privacy and securityo ft he user's identityo nt he Web. Hagel and Singer [HS99] discussed the concept of infomediaries where users have to trust and rely on at hird partyt oa ggregate their information and perform IM tasks on their behalf while protecting the privacy of their information. The Novell digitalme technology [Cra] allows users to create various identityc ards that can be shared on the Internet according to users' preferences. Users can control both what information is stored in eachc ard and conditions under whichi tm ay be shared.
3F ederated IdentityM anagement
In this section, we discuss FIM in general, LibertyA lliance and Microsoft Passport in particular. Federated identityg ives the abilityt os ecurely recognize and leverage user identities owned by trusted organizations within or across CoTs, and identityf ederation allows organizations to securely share confidential user identities with trusted ones, without requiring users to re-enter their name and password when they access their network resources. Additionally,i dentityf ederation provides the abilityt oo ptionally and securely share user information sucha st heir profiles or other data between various trusted applications which is subject to user consenta nd organizational requirements.
Twowell-known FIM solutions, LibertyAlliance and Microsoft Passport have fundamentally the same goal of managing web-based identification and authentication. Both enable organizations to build IM systems that can be federated across manyd isparate sources. Therefore, eachu ser can have as ingle network identityt hat provides SSO to the webs ites that have implemented either or both of the systems. 
LibertyA lliance

4R ole of WebS ervices in FIM
In this section, we describet he role of WS in identityf ederation. Identityf ederation usually involves three actors: IDP,S P, and users. IDP in aC oT performs the task of authentication and SP relies on IDP for authentication information of au ser before granting the user access to its services. Identityf ederation occurs with the user's consentt of ederate his local identitya tS Pw ith his identitya tI DP whichf urther facilitates SSO. In this process of federation, WS architecture has four keyc omponents: consumer, SOAP,W SDL and UDDI and provides SOAP/HTTP-baseds tandard communication vehicles among the providers [tr201] . SP can discoverI DP either statically or by querying aU DDI registry.A fterwards, SP communicates with IDP by reading its WSDLf rom UDDI, wherebyS Pc an exchange authentication request/response through service endpoints (SEP) specified in WSDL.
WebS ervices in LibertyA lliance
In LibertyA lliance, eachC oT has one or more providers using SOAP/HTTP based communication channels for exchanging authentication-related information between WS endpoints. Both SP and IDP followa greed-upon schema for federation and SSO. SecurityA ssertion Markup Language (SAML) [HBM02] is an essential componenti nt his process for the purpose of asserting authentication status of users between the providers. Af ederated sign-in at IDP would provide users with av alid session that is respected by all the SPs in its CoT. Figure 1(a) shows the WS-enabled FIM architecture for LibertyA lliance which hosts two WS components, SSO Login and Global Logout.
Federation requires au ser to opt-in by providing consentf or mapping his identities at IDP and SP.A sar esult, both IDP and SP store a pseudonym as a name identifier for the user. Pseudonyms are used by IDP laterw hen the user requests an SSO. IDP vouches for SAML-based user authentication request from SP by providing SAML-based authentication response.
Global Logout WS endpoints, also called Single Logout endpoints, receive and process logout events from SP and IDP.T ypically,w hen au ser logs out from one provider, the user's SSO session whichisactiveatthe rest of providers is invalidated by sending am essage to these WS endpoints. The user agent accesses Global Logout WS at IDP and indicates that all SPs, whicht he IDP has provided authentication for during the currents ession, must be notified of the session termination. Then, the user agentr eceives an HTTP response from IDP that confirms the completion of ag lobal logout. 
WebS ervices in Microsoft Passport
Figure 1(b) shows the Passport architecture with WS endpoints. There are WS components that makeu pP assport authentication service and involvet he implementation of the authentication service [tr103] . The primary WS component for Passport authentication model is Login Service. As implied by its name, Login WS is mainly in charge of the user authentication service. Fori nstance, au ser logging in to anyP assport-enabled site is automaticallya uthenticated by all other Passport-enabled sites, therebye nabling SSO. Subsequents ites receivet he authentication status of the user from Login WS through aC omponentC onfiguration Document( CCD). CCD is an XML documentu sed by Passport to facilitate the synchronization of the user's authentication status in participating sites.
5E xperimentations for Information Assurance: Metrics and Details
In this section, we describeo ur experimentations and results. Our goal is to measure the performance of the two models of federated identitym anagement, particularly focusing on authentication issue whichi sac ritical componentt o maintain information assurance. To measure the performance of LibertyAlliance and Microsof tP assport models, we developed as et of tools to generate and monitor loads. The performance for various keyo perations or services-sucha s federation of identities and SSO-are measured for the generated workload.
To identify those keyo perations, we first introduce an imaginary company, called MegaBank.T hen we attempt to have MegaBank playo ne of the following three roles as shown in Figure 1 : a) MegaBank as IdentityProvider, b)MegaBank as Service Provider with single third-partyI dentityP rovider, and c)MegaBank as Service Provider with two third-partyI dentityP roviders. There are various unpredictable factors sucha st he delayf rom user's end, whichp reventu sf rom producing aw orkload that is exactly similar to the real life traffic. Moreover, the workloads that we are usingm ay differ overt he scenarios depending upon the role playedb yt he MegaBank in various scenarios.
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Finally we develop metrics that are used to evaluate the performance of a system. The comparison and analysis of the systems can be done by comparing the values obtained for these measured metrics. Therefore, metrics can be termed as the keypoints that reflect the impact of the changes in system state. We have identified certain metrics for measuring the performance of the two FIM Models. These metrics are common for both models. The measuremento ft hese metrics is performed by applying monitors at various locations in the systems. Those monitors are embedded in the codes as software modules. At ypical dialog that occurs between the communicating parties in eachFIM model consists of various time factors. The dialog between as ervice provider and identityp rovider may consist of differentt ime factors as follows:
The time an entitytakes to send arequest to another entityand get aresponse backfrom that entity. Tc [ from,to] denotes where "from" is the entitya tw hicht he time is measured and "to" is the entityw hichs ends backar esponse to the request made by a" from" entity. The response sentb ackb yt he "to" entityc ompletes the communication cycle. -Data Access Time, Td at :T he time that as ervice provider or an identity provider takes to retrieveau ser's information or attributes from the local storage for the purpose of authentication is called the Data Access time. In Td at ," at" signifies the entitya tw hichd ata access time is measured. The data access time mayv ary depending upon the type or directoryservers and data access mechanism employed. -Message Processing Time, Tm at :T he time taken by the entities to process the message received. In Tm at ,"at" denotes the entityorthe communicating partya tw hichm essage processing time is measured.
The time required for redirecting aservice request from one service provider to another service provider. Tr [ sp1 ,sp2] denotes the time between the source service provider sp1and the destination servicep rovider sp2.
This sectiond escribes additional metrics, their significance, and the composition. By composition, we mean that one or more of these metrics mayb e composite. They maycontain one or more of the time factors and the actual measurementofthese time factors maydepend upon the case scenario. The steps for measuring these metrics are differentf or LibertyA lliance and Microsoft Passport because of the differences in their architecture. Though there are an umber of sub-factors that we can measure, we have limited our scopet ot he most important, required and relevantf actors to the scopeo fo ur research.
-LocalL ogin Time/ServiceP rovider Authentication Time, A sp : A sp is the time taken by ap rincipal to get authenticated at the Service Provider. This time neither facilitates federation nor SSO. The measurement of this metric is importanti ns ituations where one wantst om easure the data access time at the Service Provider. -Identity Provider Authentication Time, A i :W hen ap rincipal chooses to logon using the identityp roviders credentials, the service provider directs the principal to the identityp rovider site, whichi so ne time process, when the principal signs in for the first time. A i is the time taken by aprincipal to get authenticated just after when he signs in at the identityp roviders' site. In other words, it is obtained from Td sp -Federation Time, F i,sp :F or attempting as ingle sign-on, ap rincipal is required to federate her/his identityatthe service provider with its identityat the Identityp rovider. Figure 2s hows our experimentation results on authentication and federation issues based on the aforementioned metrics.
As we mentioned earlier, our experimental analysis represents ap roportion or asample of the population that mayexist in the real life for both the models. Moreover, the factors that affect the performance of the system mayv ary with location and deployments across enterprise applications. In suchc ases, definitives tatements cannot be made about the characteristics of all systems, but a probabilistic statementabout the range in whichthe characteristics of most systems would fit can be made. Therefore, we have adopted as tatistical approach for performance evaluation. Rather than making anyd irectives tatementa bout the superiorityo ri nferiorityo fo ne of the two models, we are summarizing the results based on their characteristics. We have adopted as tatistical approach wherebyw ec an state with ac ertain amounto fc onfidence that the values of the proposed metrics can lies within as pecified range. Moreover, we can compare these confidence intervals (CIs) for various metrics with respect to the two models. We use the methodtocalculate the CIs for unpaired observations. The brief steps for calculating the CIs that we used in this work are as follows:
1. We first calculate the sample mean X lam and X pm for Libertyand Passport, where n is the number of observations.
2. Next, we derivet he sample standard deviations S lam and S pm and it gives us the standardd eviation S of the mean difference. S = (
3. Using the standard deviation, we compute the effectiven umbero fd egrees of freedom V .
4. Finally we identify the confidence interval CI for the mean that can be used to determine the performance characteristics.
Unfortunately our results are not permitted to be available in public but we briefly describel essons learned from this work. Our analysis demonstrated the followings: a) FIM leads us to consider several trade-offs between securitya nd system overheads; b) organizational roles in FIM are very importantt oi dentify additional requirements related to performance factors; and c) it gives us an idea on whichs ystem and workload parameters mostly affect the performance of FIM models in given case scenarios. We believet his work can be helpful to IA practitioners for designing the enhanced FIM architectures.
6I nformation Assurance Issues in FIM
As an effort to identify principal IA requirements for FIM, we discuss security and privacy concerns relevantt oW Si nF IM in this section. We also describe howL ibertyA lliance and Microsoft Passport deal with these concerns to fulfill suchr equirements in their architectures.
SecurityC oncerns in FIM
Securityc oncerns in FIM can be observed from the perspectiveo ft he general objectives of informations ecurity: availability, integrity, and confidentiality. In addition, authorization is also an importanta spect to be considered in that controlled access to federated identityi nformation is strongly required. The availability of information in FIM models concerns system reliabilityand timely delivery of information. In FIM models, the availabilityo fi nformation can be ensured by not only having acommon protocol or mechanism for communicating authentication and other informationbetween parties but also securing communication channels and messages. Channel securityc an be achieved using protocols likeT LS1.0/SSL3.0 or other protocols likeI Psec with securityc haracteristics that are equivalentt oT LS or SSL. However, these protocols can only provide securityatthe transport level and not at the message level. Libertyspecifications strongly recommend TLS/SSL with well-known cipher suites [Wat03] for channel security. More details has been discussed in [SSA03] .
Message securityi si mportanti nF IM for preventing attackers and intermediaries from tampering the messages that are in transit. Improper message securityg enerates concerns likei dentityt heft, false authentication, and unauthorized use of resources. WebServices Security(WSS) [IBM02] tries to address these issues by providing securitye xtensions sucha sd igital signature and encryption to SOAP messages. Signing aS OAPp ayload using XML Digital Signature [ERB + 02] ensures the integrityo ft he message. The sender can sign a SOAP message with his private key. The receiver can then verify the signature with the sender'sp ublic keyt os ee if the message has been modified. In WS architecture, public keyi nfrastructure (PKI) can be leveraged to have organizations signs ecuritya ssertions instead of issuing certificates. LibertyA lliance specifications recommend XML Digital Signature and Encryption [IDS02] for encrypting ac omplete SOAP message or ap art of the SOAP message to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of its contents. Microsoft Passport takes an approacht oe ncrypting cookies for securing data contained within them. Cookies store sensitive information likeu ser profiles that can be securelya ccessed by authorized parties.
FIM requires communicating parties to provide controlled access of information to legitimate users. Authorization deals withw hat information au ser or an application has access to or whicho perations au ser or an application can perform. Proper authorization mechanisms are necessary in WS communication especially when the communication endpointi sa cross multiple hops. Libertys pecifications recommend ap ermission-based attribute sharing mechanism, whiche nables users to specify authorization policies on their information that they want to share. Similarly,M icrosoft Passport allows users to have their choices regarding the information they want to share with participating sites.
Privacy Concerns in FIM
Privacy is ag rowing concern with FIM models due to the voluminous exchange of sensitivei nformation that occur across enterprises. Securing communication channels and encrypting messages mayh elp preservet he privacy of relevanti nformation only up to some extent. The securityc oncerns that we discussed in the previous section are obviously applicable to privacy as well. In WS-enabled FIM where the receiver of am essage mayn ot be its ultimate destination, improper security measuresm ay result in unauthorized access of user's personal information whichl eads to violation of privacy.
Protection of user identities and personal information can be achieved by using the principle of pseudonymity. Obfuscating message payloads can also preservet heir privacy by making them accessible only by authorizedp arties having proper credentials or keys [MPB03] Liberty's SAML implementation uses pseudonyms constructed using pseudorandom values that have no discernable correspondence with users' identifiers at IDP or SP.The pseudonym has ameaning only in the context of the relationship between the two communicating parties. The intenti st oc reate an on-public pseudonym so as to contravene the linkabilityt ou sers' identities or activities, therebym aintaining the privacy.
Organizations using FIM models is required to followf our keyp rinciples of fair information practices whicha re discussed in [tr102] :
-Notice :U sers should receivep rior notice of the information practices.
-Choice :U sers have ac hoice to specify what information will be used and the purpose for whicht he information is collected. -Access:Users should be able to access and modify their personal information as and when needed. -Security:U sers should be assured that the organizational system is capable of securing their personal information.
Libertys pecifications have recently proposed an approacht os haring user attributes on the basis of user's permission. The specifications also provide a set of guidelines that will help businesses adhere to these principles. Microsoft Passport's approacht oo nline privacy is also based on adherence to these aforementioned principles.
7C onclusion and Future Works
Information securitya nd privacy issues are the keyc oncerns in FIM because identityfederation requires the exchange of sensitiveuser information in ahighly insecure and open network. In this paper, we discussed two well-known FIM solutions, Microsoft Passport and LibertyAlliance and howWScan playanintegral role in FIM. In addition, we have identified certain metrics that are crucial when considering aFIM model. These metrics are composite metrics whichmay consist of measuring one or more of the time factors. Also, we identified and discussed core IA requirements in FIM focusing on WS-relevanti ssues. We believeo ur work can be leveraged by the researcha nd industry communities working on issues in identitym anagement.
Our future work will focus on ap rivacy attribute managementf ramework within LibertyA lliance whichc an provide users with ah igh level of confidence in the privacy of their personal data. Developing IA metrics for FIM is another issue that we intend to work on in the near future. It is generally believed that no single perfect set of IA metrics can be applied to all systems. Thus, we would attempt to investigate IA metrics specifically designed for FIM systems.
